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Abstract. War or conflict is an activity of aggression and violence with weapons and new 
technologies for resolving internal and/or international disputes between two or more 
nations, between organized ethnic, social and religious groups, etc., for the purpose of 
reducing the freedom of other societies/groups and causing social, economic, culturalor 
ethnic damages over time. The theories of the causes of wars can be distinguished in 
historical and modern theories. In general, a general theory of the causes of war is difficult 
to create because of manifold factors engaged in triggering conflicts over time and space. 
This study describes some theories that focus on specific factors generating a socioeconomic 
disequilibrium between nations and different populations that can lead to war.  
Keywords. Conflict, Struggle, Disputes, War. 
JEL. O32, O33. 
 
1. Introduction  
cholars of different disciplines have investigated what causes 
warwith different theories based on approaches from philosophy, 
history, psychology, economics, demography, sociology, biology, etc. 
(Ackoff & Rovin, 2003; Levy, 2011). In particular, the theories of the causes 
of wars can be distinguished in historicaland modern theories (Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1. Theories of the causes of wars 
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2. Historical theories of the causes of war  
A general theory of the causes of war is difficult to create because of 
manifold factors engaged in triggering conflicts over time and space. This 
section describes some historical theories that focus on specific factors 
generating a socioeconomic disequilibrium between nations and different 
populations that can lead to war.  
The theory of no economic advantage of wars by Norman Angell 
One of the theories about causes and effects of wars in society is by 
Norman Angell (1911). The thesis of this lecturer, journalist, politician and 
Nobel Peace Prize winnerin 1933 is that war does not generate any 
economic advantage for winners. The proof of this interesting theory is 
based on different points as follows.  
- When winners of wars destroy enemy populations or seize their wealth, 
they damage themselves because destroy the commercial opportunities. 
- If winners impose fiscal clauses to losers also limit commercial 
opportunities for themselves, generating damages both for winners and 
losers.  
- If winners decide of not imposing to losers customs restrictions but a 
policy of free exchange in commerce, winners have benefits, but at the 
same time losers have high economic advantages that can be used to 
support physical and human capital and a potential revenge, creating 
for winners a continuous source of troubles.  
- If winners impose a war allowance, it can increase government debt 
that can be supported creating new currency which increases prices 
without increasing wealth (inflation), generating a variable unit of 
measure of currency in commercial negotiations.  
- If winners annex the territories of losers, they generate a simple change 
of public governance and administration, and a source of potential 
socioeconomic issues in the future.  
- If winners transform territories of losers in colonies, they do not have 
any advantage because colonies can be sources of rebellion, internal 
wars, increasing public expense for winners to maintain social and 
political stability.  
In short, the utilization of military force for resolving disputes between 
states and/or groups does not generate any economic advantage. This 
thesis by Angell has been confuted by some scholars, such as the prof. of 
Glasgow University I. H. Jones in 1915 and prof. of the Sapienza University 
of Rome Corrado Gini (1921). However, today this approach by Norman 
Angell can be true because humankind and geoeconomic areas have 
societies more and more inter-related, forming a world system with 
indissoluble economic interrelationships among different states based on 
development of bank systems, and communication and information 
technologies. Hence, conflicts between countries and/or different societies 
that are elements of the same systemcan create only mutual damages. 
When all populations will know the uselessness of wars, the optimistic 
prediction by Angell (1911) is that wars may disappear, such as religion 
 M. Coccia, JEST, 6(2), 2019, p.115-124. 
116 
 
Journal of Economic and Social Thought 
wars. Unfortunately, from 1910s, when Angell (1911) wrote his book,called 
The Great Illusion, many wars have been occurred and in the future other 
wars can occur and recur between nations thatseem to beirrational actors in 
the presence of environmental tensions and threats.  
The theory of wars based on historical causes by James Novicow 
This theory explains war with historical causes. James Novicow, a 
sociologist of pacifist theory, in 1894 argued that wars persist and repeat 
because of historical causes that generate an inertia force in society. This 
theory simply states that current and future causes of wars are due to an 
individual and social routine of human behavior, though wars do not 
generate any advantage for winners and losers. This theory is, of course, a 
simple explanation of the reasons of war with weak empirical foundations.  
The theory of natural human combativenessby Nietzsche and other theorists 
Another theory, that Novicow rejects, is based on natural human 
combativeness. This theoretical framework is claimed by many theorists of 
war, such as Nietzsche, Gumplovics, Ratzenhofer, Steimnetz, Mahan, etc. 
Although some policymakers and governments recommend pacifistic 
approaches, there are instincts rooted in human nature that lead to wars 
and conflicts betweenorganized groups for manifold factors. However, 
economic interests seem to overpower the instincts of combativeness in 
society, such that this theory has many contradictions. 
The theory of biological and sociological necessities to protect nations from 
decline 
The difference between the theory of human combativeness and 
teleological theory of war to safeguard some nations from decline is that 
the first theory considers human combativeness as a cause of war, the 
second one it considers human combativeness as effects of war. In short, 
this theory, supported by many scholars, argues that struggles and conflicts 
are due to natural agents given byhigh growth rate of populationthat 
increases the density of some regions generating social tensions and factors 
associated with aggression of human behavior (cf., Gini, 1921).  
The theory of psychological diversity between populations 
Another theory suggests that the causes of war are due to psychological 
diversity of populations in regions and/or macro regions. These possible 
reasons of war create intergroup hostility betweendifferent societies that 
have common identities based on religious and cultural traditions (cf., 
Choma et al., 2016; van Bergen et al., 2015). These causes are necessary but 
not sufficient conditions for wars because the diversity between 
populations are permanents factors, whereas conflicts are intermittent 
eventsin society over time and space. Moreover, these causes tend to be 
lower over time because of the reduction of heterogeneity between nations 
for high mobility of people generated by faster communication and 
transportation means, and higher intellectual contacts.   
The theory of demographic causes of war by Gini and other scholars 
This theory argues that population of states with a high density tends to 
pour out in nations with scarce population. The high demographic pressure 
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of a nation on another nation is due to a different ratio between level of 
population and spatial area. This theory explains past wars between 
Germany against France that had a national surface similar to Germany but 
with a lower population and a lower fertility. In this theory, some scholars 
claim that the demographic pressure of a nation on another one is due to a 
different ratio between population and economic resources. In this context, 
Robert Malthus considered wars as a repressive factor of the disequilibrium 
between population and basic goods. Some scholars support the arguments 
of this theory that the expansion of a population can be due to scarce 
essentials or other natural and economic factors. In short, the theory of 
demographic causes of wars are due to a high demographic pressure 
generated by nations having a different ratio between population and 
wealth (economic resources). In fact, according to this theory, the high 
demographic pressure generating war is due to a disequilibrium between 
populations of two nations, shortage that one nation has in basic goods, a 
low economic growth in comparison with population, and/or also an 
insatiable desire of some societies of further supporting a growing national 
income. Overall, then, the positive correlation between high population 
density and violent behavior leading to war can be explained with the 
association between high density of people and poverty in some regions. In 
other words, high density of population and the unbalanced growth of 
economic resources negatively influence social relations and lead to 
deteriorated human functioning that in specific geoeconomic zones may 
contribute to support violence and war (Altman, 1975; Baum & Paulus, 
1991; Lepore et al., 1991). In order to synthetize a general theory of the 
causes of war, Gini (1921) states that wars or conflicts with weapons 
between peoples or between social classes are due to exasperation in all or 
some social classes, to human combativeness in the presence of obstacles 
that psychic diversity between populations oppose to the tendency of the 
various social elements to distribute themselves according to their natural 
expansion force. 
 
3. Modern theories of the reasons for war 
Theories of the failure in bargaining 
Jackson & Morelli (2011) suggest two prerequisites for a war between 
rational actors: firstly, the costs of war cannot be overwhelmingly high, i.e. 
wars occur with rational actors if the gains from the conflict will outweigh 
the costs incurred. Secondly, there has to be a failure in bargaining (cf., 
Fearon, 1995). Thus, to explain how wars may occur, it is important to 
understand bargaining failures given by different factors:  
• Asymmetric information about the potential costs and benefits of war;  
• A lack of ability to enforce a bargaining agreement and/or a lack of the 
ability to credibly commit to abide by an agreement;  
• Indivisibilities of resources that might change hands in a war, so that 
not all potentially mutually beneficial bargaining agreements are 
feasible;  
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• Agency problems, where the incentives of leaders differ from those of 
the populations that they represent;  
• Multilateral interactions where every potential agreement is blocked by 
some coalition of states or constituencies who can derail it. 
In general, modern approaches argue that some causes of war are due to 
some level of irrationality of actors (Jackson & Morelli, 2011). Religion, 
according to these approaches can be a cause of war between nations. The 
goal might be to increasethe size of population of one religion or eradicate 
another. In such situations, even with full commitment and bargaining 
opportunities, there might be no agreement that appeases an aggressor. 
That is, even if agreements are available and fully enforceable, agents are 
driven by a specific goal that may be incompatible with the well-being or 
autonomy of another population. Revenge is another reason for war within 
the set of non-rationalist explanations of war. Another reason of war is to 
rationalize the incentives to eliminate another ethnic group or minority 
ideological group by a desire to obtain a higher social power in current 
and/or future period (cf., Esteban & Ray, 2008).  
Theory of the democratic peace 
The theoretical framework of democratic peace states that democracies 
rarely go to war.  
Scholars argue that democratic societies are averse to war because of the 
nature of democratic culture and also because citizens will not vote to send 
themselves off to war. Moreover, the norms of peaceful resolution of 
disputes within democracies are extended to interactions with other 
democracies. Fearon (2011) rationalizes democratic peace arguing that: “the 
stronger country between two potential contenders usually has a higher 
GDP [Gross Domestic Product] per capita. If it is democratic, then, even if 
the leader promises to a set of supporters some benefits from the war, it 
cannot avoid the possibility that eventually, once democratic rules apply to 
the unified country in case of victory, the GDP per capita of the winning 
country will go down. Hence voters of a richer democracy who believe that 
the unified country will lead to wealth redistribution should be against the 
war, and hence only weak contenders should remain interested in wars. 
However, weaker countries will generally have less interest in entering a 
conflict to begin with due to a low probability of success” (as quoted by 
Jackson & Morelli, 2011; cf., Levy, 2011).  
Theories of endogenous power 
Some theories explain the incentives of countries to arm and create wars. 
As a matter of fact, the probability of war depends on prior investments in 
arms, and incentives to arm depend on how arms affect future incentives to 
go to war or to bargain. In short, decisions to go to war depend on 
endogenous armament environment in which they reside (endogenous 
power, see Jackson & Morelli, 2011). Peaceful outcomes are not necessarily 
the efficient ones in the presence of endogenous-arms settings. Arms are 
wasteful, and long periods of peace with costly armament levels can be 
worse than having an early conflict and then thereafter living in a unified 
 M. Coccia, JEST, 6(2), 2019, p.115-124. 
119 
 
Journal of Economic and Social Thought 
country with peace without the need for arms. A peace agreement only 
becomes attainable after the balance of power has shifted, such that there is 
an interest in both sides to agree to peace. However, this process can take a 
long run. 
The theory of global leadership  
Superpowers are nations with a high economic-war potential and the 
ability and expertise to influence other geoeconomic regions (Coccia, 2019). 
Superpowers have a purpose to achieve/sustain a global leadership and 
they can develop conflicts to cope with environmental threats or to take 
advantage of important opportunities. Put differently, superpowers, 
winning international conflicts, can achieve and/or sustain a global 
leadership in world economy to take advantage of important opportunities 
(Coccia, 2015, p. 203). Linstone (2007, p.115) states that: “the winner in each 
case became the leading global power, a new global political economy 
emerged, and democracy advanced” (cf., Devezas, 2006; Linstone, 2007a). 
In fact, world is increasingly global, complex, turbulent, rich, 
interconnected and multilevel; the only feasible strategy of superpowers 
with conflict development is to achieve/sustain a global leadership in world 
economy that is subsequently sustained with an economic and 
technological superiority in comparison with other competitive nations (cf., 
Modelski, 2010, p.1419ff). The conflict development by superpowers 
appears to be necessary phases for human development, which is not a 
monotonous and linear but rather a disequilibrium process of the dynamics 
of world system (cf., Gini, 1921). The conflict development by superpowers 
can be also due to prove military and scientific superiority towards other 
belligerent nations to maintain the status quo of current leadership and 
social power in the international system. In particular, conflict 
development of superpower generatesdemand- and supply-side shocks for 
domestic economy and for economies of allied countries. In fact, conflictcan 
establish main technological, economic and infrastructural preconditions 
for an “age of high mass consumption” (Rostow, 1959, pp.11-13). The 
effects of military conflicts support output, productivity and technological 
growth of superpowers and inter-related countries (cf., Ruttan, 2006). For 
instance, Wright (1997, p.1565) examines the “American technological 
leadership” and shows that manufacturing sectors for U.S. economy have 
taken advantage from fruitful demand- and supply-side effects of 
conflicts.Superpowers, developing conflicts, support R&D investments to 
produce military technologies that are transferred to civilian applications in 
the long term generating new patterns of economic growth. In short, the 
mobilization of human and economic resources by superpowers for conflict 
development increases the rates of inventions and technological 
innovations that in the post-war period are diffused to support 
productivity and long-run economic growth (Stein & Russett, 1980, p.412; 
 M. Coccia, JEST, 6(2), 2019, p.115-124. 
120 
 
Journal of Economic and Social Thought 
Coccia, 2015, 2017, 2018)1. In this theory, the conflict development of some 
countries can be also due to change the hierarchy of power between nations 
in the international system and generate a new distribution of power at 
international level (cf. Levy, 1983; 2011). Modelski (1972, p.48) asserts that 
the “war causes the Great Powers”, such as Roman Empire over 
200BC ∼ 400AD, Britain Empire in the 1710-1850 period, the USA from 
1940s onwards, etc. (Stein & Russett, 1980). However, super powers may 
assume a worldwide role close to autocracy in order to sustain the global 
leadership with a behavior prone to a permanent “wartime” and strains in 
different geoeconomic regions (Linstone, 2007, p.237). Overall, then, this 
theory by Coccia (2015) argues that nations, with a high economic potential, 
develop conflict for the goal to achieve/sustain a position ofglobal 
leadershipand increase the social power in the international system to take 
advantage of important economic opportunities over time. 
 
4. Conclusion 
A comprehensive analysis of the causes of war, affected by manifold 
factors, is a non-trivial exercise. Wars are associated with human activity 
and human nature in order to take advantage of important opportunities, 
to cope with and/or adapt to environmental threats and/or changing 
contexts.  Overall, then, wars are due to instability of economic, social, 
demographic, ethnic, anthropological, religious and perhaps biological 
factors of human society. Finally, sources of wars are mainly linked to the 
question of what human beings truly need and how they seek to satisfy 
needs, solve social issues and adapt to changing contexts and 














1For studies about measurement of technology, technological evolution and sources of 
technology, cf., Calabrese et al., 2005; Coccia, 2003, 2005, 2005a, 2005b, 2005c, 2006, 2010, 
2010a, 2013, 2013a, 2014, 2014a, 2014b, 2014c, 2014d, 2014e, 2015, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c, 2016, 
2016a, 2016b, 2017, 2017a, 2017b, 2018, 2018a, 2018b, 2018c, 2018d, 2019, 2019a; Coccia 
&Bozeman, 2016; Coccia & Cadario, 2014; Coccia et al., 2015; Coccia & Rolfo, 2009, 2010, 
2013; Coccia & Wang, 2016. 
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